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There has been an unprecedented proliferation in foreign direct investment and
non-foreign direct investment flows in the past two decades.1 Orthodox economists
and international financial institutions have argued that developing countries care-
fully following a proper sequence of internal and external financial liberalization
would be able to access these capital flows to enhance welfare and development.
Indeed, the promise of higher growth and welfare combined with the conditionality of
international financial institutions, has led to the widespread adoption of financial
liberalization in developing countries. Unfortunately, the promise had proven empty.
Thus, despite the dramatic increase in gross capital flows, economic growth in
developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s has actually been half of the level of the
1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the pattern of cross-border financial flows has
been extremely skewed and uneven. Few developing countries have been able to
access these flows, with the bulk of non-foreign direct investment and foreign direct
investment flows going to a handful of emerging market economies. Moreover, the
period of increased global flows has been associated with an unprecedented increase
in instability and crisis. While orthodox economists have used a variety of approaches
to explain these crises along with offering remedial policy proposals, these explana-
tions and solutions suffer from the same static conceptual tools embedded in their
arguments for financial liberalization.
We argue that financial transformation in an era of global flows requires an en-
tirely different theoretical understanding. This paper critically examines the main-
stream rationale for financial globalization and openness as well as its explanations
for the financial instability and crises associated with financial openness. The main-
stream claim for the close association between financial globalization and economic
development is then challenged in light of empirical observations on the pattern of
global finance and the financial globalization-growth nexus, while the diagnosis of288 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the crises and policy proposals are juxtaposed with alternative theoretical perspec-
tives.
Based on alternative dynamic analyses of the symbiotic relationships between
finance and economic development, we propose an institutional-centered approach
that forms a basis for understanding the institutional transformation required for
financial development. In this context, we argue that financial flows can be seen as a
series of domestic and international circuits that intersect among themselves and
with the real flows of commodity and productive resources. Institutionally, each flow
has a set of internally interconnected capacities, incentives, norms, regulations and
organizations. For development to occur, financial flows need to feed into real sector
circuits to enhance expansion and accumulation, whilst national flows need to tap
into international flows to complement the speed and capacity of the domestic flows
to feed into the real sector circuitry.
We begin by presenting a critical review of mainstream theories on the welfare
gains from financial globalization as well as the emerging pattern of global financial
flows and their developmental consequences. We then discuss the standard interpre-
tations of the dynamics of financial crises in emerging market economies along with
policy recommendations to counter crises. These explanations and prescriptions are
then contrasted with alternative approaches that locate the source of financial fragil-
ity and instability in the functioning of a market economy itself. We continue by
developing further an alternative conceptual framework and exploring possible policy
alternatives to facilitate the transformation of financial institutions for development.
In the conclusion we evaluate some of the institutional mechanisms for accessing
global financial flows.
GLOBAL FINANCIAL FLOWS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Mainstream Theories on Welfare Gains from Financial Globalization
The key function of financial systems in the saving-investment-growth nexus is
to act as an effective conduit for: (a) channeling funds from surplus to deficit units by
mobilizing resources and ensuring an efficient transformation of funds into real pro-
ductive capital; (b) the maturity transformation between savers and investors, while
providing sufficient liquidity to the system as the need arises; (c) reducing risks from
the system through diversification and techniques of risk sharing and risk pooling.
Following Goldsmith’s [1969] study of the effects of the financial deepening on
economic growth, a large number of econometric exercises have been conducted to
examine the relationship between financial sector development and economic growth.
Many recent empirical studies have been motivated to test the financial repression
hypothesis that has provided an analytical platform for financial liberalization policy
[McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973].2 Recent theoretical studies have tried to establish
precise mechanisms through which financial systems influence economic develop-
ment.3 For example, while Gertler and Rose [1994] examine the symbiotic relation-
ships between finance and growth, others emphasize specific roles of financial inter-
mediaries such as: lowering the social cost of investing in intangible capital [King
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downside uncertainty about rates of return [Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990] and
the growth-inducing role of financial innovation [Pagano, 1993].
The functions of capital markets are also identified as a mechanism of an easy
asset/portfolio allocation and diversification for the public, providing efficient and
transparent price signals and liquidity in the secondary market, where savers/inves-
tors with a strong preference for holding short-term liquid assets could participate in
markets of long-term securities and bonds issued for illiquid productive investment.
Thus, an active and broad-based capital market is thought to mitigate the acute short-
age of term loans and equity financing, and transform maturities.
Extending these lines of arguments spatially to cross-border financial transac-
tions and intermediation, the effects of financial globalization on economic develop-
ment and world welfare are tacitly assumed to be positive through the same saving-
investment-growth nexus. Thus, Rousseau and Sylla [2001] claim financial global-
ization ensures an efficient intermediation between saving and investment on a glo-
bal scale. Specifically, an intertemporal borrowing/lending model as applied to cross-
border capital trade is used as a theoretical basis to demonstrate benefits from finan-
cial globalization in allowing capital to seek out its highest rewards while providing
developing countries means for higher investment as well as consumption smoothing
and insurance against shocks [Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996].
Indeed, in the extreme version of the neoclassical world with no information fric-
tion and no transaction cost, once impediments to free capital mobility are removed,
funds are seen to flow from low marginal product of capital-rich countries to high
marginal product of capital-poor countries as the capital market works to equalize
risk-adjusted marginal products of capital across borders. It is claimed that as finan-
cial globalization proceeds, the efficiency of global resource allocation increases, and
that developing countries emerge as winners.
Further, the model of global portfolio diversification is used to emphasize the
welfare gains associated with global risk sharing and shifting, that is, a possibility
arising from portfolio diversification through internationally integrated markets. The
model predicts that international asset trade allows each country to hold a globally
diversified portfolio of risky investments, resulting in substantial risk reduction
through sharing. This is claimed to lead to an increase in world economic growth and
national welfare. It has provided economists with an added reason to push an agenda
of financial globalization, which is claimed to serve the interest of developing coun-
tries.
In this context, the rapidly rising share of emerging markets in world stock mar-
ket capitalization since the late 1980s was presented as one of most promising ways
for developing countries to join the rich countries’ club. Among many others, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine [1996] interpreted this trend as a “win-win” situation resulting
from mutually beneficial actions by two parties: (a) international investors seeking a
globally diversified portfolio, promising higher returns; and (b) developing countries
removing barriers to international capital flows and expanding domestic stock mar-
kets in their efforts to accelerate economic development. The sharp resurgence of
international portfolio flows (bond and equity) to emerging markets since the late
1980s is then popularly examined in terms of both pull factors and push factors [Tay-
lor and Sarno, 1997; Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 1996]. Pull factors are coun-290 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
try-specific conditions in emerging market economies that reflect opportunity and
risk for international investors, while push factors are global conditions such as cy-
clical movements in returns or interest rates or business conditions in developed
market economies.
All in all, Obstfeld concludes, “Economic theory leaves no doubt about the poten-
tial advantages of global financial trading” [1998, 10]. He further suggests that the
international capital market plays a role of disciplining policymakers “who might be
tempted to exploit a captive domestic capital market” [ibid.]. However, this disciplin-
ing role is also closely related to the severe constraints that financial openness places
on macroeconomic management of emerging-market economies—a condition known
as the macroeconomic policy trilemma for open economies or inconsistent trinity the-
sis. The thesis stipulates that an open capital market deprives governments of the
ability simultaneously to target its exchange rate and to use monetary policy in pur-
suit of other economic objectives.
Besides, as Obstfeld [1998] himself notes, there are further costs associated with
financial globalization: (a) a loss of fiscal autonomy, since financial openness makes
it hard to tax internationally footloose capital relative to labor due to the competition
for foreign savings through tax incentives;4 (b) negative income distribution effects
through changes in relative factor prices associated with factor movements; and fi-
nally (c) the increased susceptibility of participating countries to financial instabil-
ity, often culminating in severe financial crises. Thus, financial globalization is well
recognized to entail genuine costs, risks and hazards.
Liberalization Experiences and Results
On the basis of the promise of significant net gains for productive investment and
economic growth, however, many developing countries have embraced, with open
arms, financial globalization by adopting internal and external financial liberaliza-
tion policies. They have also taken regulatory and fiscal measures to encourage the
development of money and stock markets, often in association with large-scale
privatization programs. Under the encouragement and supervision of international
financial institutions, the policy of liberalization/deregulation has been a cornerstone
of their development and growth strategy over the last two decades.5
Responding to these favorable pull factors, there was a surge in international
capital flows to emerging market economies in 1990-97. Yet there has been a rather
weak link, if at all, between investment-growth performance on one hand, and do-
mestic and external financial liberalization on the other. Eatwell suggests that “free
international capital flows” have been “associated with a deterioration in economic
efficiency as measured by growth and unemployment” [1997, 2].
Domestic financial sector reform, whether comprehensive and sweeping or mea-
sured and gradual, has not, as a rule, made any significant difference to the saving
and investment activities in the liberalized economies. A sharp increase in nominal
interest rates following liberalization tends to worsen the risk composition of banks’
loan portfolios, giving rise to the well-known problem of adverse incentives and selec-
tion as well as aggravating the moral hazard problem [Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981]. In
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have resulted in a dramatic increase in the share of non-performing loans in bank
portfolios. Systems of supervision and regulation have been weakened considerably
due to a proliferation of banking and non-banking financial institutions [Chang, 1998].
Furthermore, in the absence of adequate supervision and regulation, close politico-
business coalitions can be forged under liberalization through money politics and
patronage [Stein et al., 2002].
Liberalization, in the form of increased competitiveness of the banking system,
has not led to an increase in long-term finance, or the reduction of intermediation
costs. Further, there is little evidence to support the proposition that stock market
development would lead to higher productive investment [Singh, 1997]. The stock
market boom in emerging market economies, supported by speculative asset shuf-
fling, could be far removed from real productive investment activities.
All in all, cross-border capital mobility has significantly increased the degree of
instability in macroeconomic conditions of emerging economies, rather than provid-
ing the promised stable source for productive investment. Indeed, the surge in capi-
tal inflows has led both to real exchange rate appreciation (harmful for tradable
sectors) and to a creation of disproportionately large financial excess (typically epito-
mized by asset price bubbles in the real estate sector and stock markets).
Moreover, the large discrepancies between gross capital flows and net capital flows
reflected in countries’ current account positions point to the condition where diversi-
fication finance far overwhelms development finance in cross-border capital transac-
tions [Obstfeld and Taylor, 2001]. In other words, international capital markets in
the recent decades have not performed an intermediation function between saving
supply and investment demand on a global scale. Rather, as Obstfeld and Taylor
observe,
(t)oday’s foreign asset distribution is much more about asset swap-
ping by rich countries - diversification - than it is about the accumula-
tion of large one-way positions - a critical component of the develop-
ment process in poorer countries in the standard textbook treatments.
It is more about hedging and risk sharing than it is about long-term
finance… [ibid., 64]
Thus, in our view, cross-border capital flows have been largely driven by push
factors reflecting international investors’ interests, because international financial
integration has proceeded under uncovered real interest parity conditions as an arbi-
trage mechanism. In this process, emerging economies have merely accommodated
international investors’ diversification needs, governed by economic cyclical condi-
tions in developed market economies. Emerging economies have de facto provided
international investors with attractive pull conditions, by adopting financial liberal-
ization policies.
Thus, despite the rhetoric surrounding net benefits of financial globalization, it
is difficult to obtain hard empirical evidence establishing the positive link between
financial globalization and economic development. Moreover, the social and economic
costs posed by the macroeconomic policy trilemma is unacceptably high for develop-292 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ing countries, as witnessed repeatedly in the recent financial crises that have sub-
merged almost all the developing countries.
Yet, after admitting that financial globalization involves both “enormous ben-
efits and non-negligible downside risks”, mainstream economists continue to argue
that “the duality of benefits and risks (in financial transactions) is inescapable in the
real world of asymmetric information and imperfect contract enforcement,” and that
“the best way to maximize net benefits is to encourage economic integration, while
attacking concomitant distortions and other unwanted side effects at, or, close to”
their sources… in confronting the global capital market there is no reason to depart
from conventional economic wisdom” [Obstfeld, 1998, 10]. Similarly, Aizenman pre-
sents the problem arising from financial globalization as a complex trade off between
the adverse short- to medium-term effects and the beneficial long-run effects of fi-
nancial opening.6 From this perspective, he argues, “the challenge is to design a lib-
eralization program that does not bring a financial crisis in its wake” [2002, 6].
Policy stances of this nature are, in our view, often a reflection of their limited
understanding of the real origins and true dynamics of financial crises that have
threatened emerging economies in recent years. To support our argument, we now
turn to a brief review of literature on the nature and causes of recent financial crises.
DYNAMICS OF FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKET
ECONOMIES
The Conventional Interpretations of Financial Crises
According to the standard interpretation, the chain of events leading to the finan-
cial crisis in East Asia was the use of a predetermined nominal exchange rate, com-
bined with large capital inflows that were intermediated by a weak banking system,
generating a situation of exchange-rate overvaluation, a vulnerable financial sector
and eventually the collapse of the currency.7 This had subsequently evolved into a
general economic crisis with a severe decline in the net worth of both borrowers/
savers and financial institutions. Indeed, the Asian crisis started as a crisis that
primarily arose from financial excess and took the form of a twin crises—currency
crises and financial sector crises as interrelated phenomena [Corsetti et al., 1998,
Mishkin, 2001]. As such, it shared a commonality, in several aspects, with previous
financial crises: speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates, asset price bubbles,
market crashes, and bank runs resulting from the combined effects of overinvest-
ment, underregulation, and overvaluation [Miller and Luangaram, 1998].
Yet, it is worth emphasizing one of the specific features of the Asian crisis: the
crisis happened as a direct result of overinvestment by private agents, rather than
overconsumption or government overspending as is said to be the case with many
Latin American crises before. In this sense, the crisis was the least anticipated. Many
studies have emerged to examine this overinvestment condition. For example,
McKinnon and Pill [1998] explain overborrowing/overinvestment and the twin crisis
in terms of moral hazard problems inherent in weak domestic financial systems and
exacerbated by implicit or explicit deposit insurance domestically, as well as interna-
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private sector becomes euphoric about the success of reform (that is, liberalization
policy in their context) because of the overly optimistic signal about macroeconomic
developments contained in loose credit conditions. When credit booms eventually
end in bust with unrealizable expectations and increasingly risky bank assets, the
probability of bank failure will be increased: banks would suffer additional capital
losses following devaluation from the currency mismatch on their balance sheet, pre-
cipitating a general financial crisis.
Miller and Luangaram [1998] augment the above explanation by adding asset
market conditions as an endogenous part of financial crisis dynamics, noting that
currency crises have been preceded by a boom-bust cycle of asset prices. They sug-
gest a close link between the performance of the financial sector and asset prices
through collateral. As Asian firms are highly geared with financial institutions, the
link between asset prices and banking performances may have tightly prevailed.
In all these models, it is an eventual realization of banks’ negative net worth that
triggers bank runs. Bank runs could induce, and escalate into, an open currency cri-
sis, since a central bank’s ability to defend a currency becomes increasingly ques-
tioned as a result of considerably increased vulnerability of the financial sector caused
by the currency/maturity mismatch problem that is exacerbated by a large devalua-
tion. Thus, Miller [1998] notes that there are important linkages between bank sol-
vency and currency stability and that causation may run in either direction.
The rapid pace and the wrong sequence of liberalization are blamed as key cul-
prits [Mishkin, 2001]. Upon capital account liberalization, a credit boom in a number
of miracle Asian economies in the 1990s was stoked by large short-term private capi-
tal inflows [Goldstein, 2001]. Sterilization policies applied to neutralize the mon-
etary impact of large inflows aggravated the situation by raising domestic interest
rates and inducing further inflow of interest-sensitive capital [Calvo, 2001]. This also
created an additional incentive to domestic borrowers in raising funds in interna-
tional capital markets. A crisis condition then arose from a sudden large-scale capi-
tal outflow triggered by a wake-up call. Precipitous surges and withdrawals of inter-
national capital had contributed to asset price bubbles in their boom as well as to
price crashes.
Furthermore, under de jure or de facto fixed exchange rate regimes, little man-
agement of currency exposure was undertaken despite potentially hazardous cur-
rency/maturity mismatches. Speculative attacks on the currency, triggered by sud-
den reversals of market confidence, directly hit this vulnerable balance-sheet posi-
tion, turning banks and corporations that were solvent in the pre-currency-crisis pe-
riod into insolvency and bankruptcy.
Clearly, the recent financial crises are very much a crisis of globalizing capital,
with large contagion effects throughout emerging market economies at large. Radelet
and Sachs [1998], emphasizing this aspect, argue that the Asian crisis is “a testa-
ment to the shortcomings of international capital markets and their vulnerability to
sudden reversals of market confidence” and that “the unwillingness or inability of
the capital market to provide fresh loans to the illiquid borrower is the nub of the
matter” [1998].294 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Policy Perspectives Arising Out of Standard Diagnoses
The variety of policy reform proposals reflect the diferences in understanding the
causes of the financial crisis. Those who view the crisis more as resulting from the
deficiency of the global financial system, have emphasized the need for a New Inter-
national Financial Architecture, encompassing measures for more effective ex-post
crisis management as well as more prudent ex-ante allocation of credit [Eichengreen,
1999; Aizenman, 2002]. For example, the illiquidity-coordination failure hypothesis
stresses the need for orderly workout mechanisms or an establishment of an Inter-
national Bankruptcy Court. Among ex-ante crisis prevention measures to address
the high volatility of international capital flows, there are a number of proposals
dealing with regulation and supervision of international capital flows at the national
and global levels. The New Basle codes or the Tobin tax proposal is discussed in this
context.
Others tend to confine their discussion on policy reform more to domestic mea-
sures [Mishkin, 2001]. An emphasis is placed on improving supervision and the regu-
lation of financial institutions in emerging market economies, so as to ensure greater
transparency and the proper monitoring of bank portfolios with an improved flow of
timely and quality information. Many of them forcefully argue that a root cause for
repeated financial crises facing emerging economies is domestic. In their view, the
Asian crises are essentially caused by the problem of insolvency rather than illiquid-
ity. It is argued that the domestic banking system in the crisis-afflicted economies
had long been aggravated by the moral hazard problem due to perverse financial
incentives, distorted asset prices, and misallocated resources associated with con-
nected or political lending. This condition is said to have encouraged banks to gamble
for resurrection, leading ultimately to a creditor panic.
A two corner-solution view has also emerged as a dominant position in the debate
on the appropriate exchange rate regimes for emerging market economies prone to
financial crises. Resorting to the impossible trinity thesis, this view (or the hollow-
ing-out thesis) states that intermediate regimes are not viable under financial glo-
balization, because of their vulnerability to speculative attacks (self-filling or other-
wise). For example, Eichengreen concludes that “a middle ground of pegged but ad-
justable exchange rates and exchange rate target zones will hollow out and policy
makers will be confronted with a choice between floating and monetary union” [1999,
134].
However, this debate on appropriate exchange rate regimes is driven by the im-
perative of financial globalization. Their arguments rest on the assumption that fi-
nancial openness alone should not be challenged in the trinity, either because of the
considerable benefits that openness is promised to produce in emerging economies,
or because free capital mobility is inevitable due to changes in global technology,
market structure or politics. As Frankel [1999] suggests, however, the inconsistent
trinity thesis does not, in principle, imply that countries cannot have a half-indepen-
dent monetary policy and a half-fixed exchange rate by adopting intermediate re-
gimes such as target zone; nor does it imply that countries cannot have both an
independent monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate by imposing effective capital
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Alternative Approaches to the Analysis of Financial Crises
In our view, the conventional analyses of financial crises does not really provide
us with an in-depth understanding of how endogenous forces of market economies
could give rise to financial crises. Hence, the prevailing policy discussion on crisis
prevention and management reflects the rather shallow analysis of the dynamics of
financial crisis. To initiate a more constructive policy discussion, we have to under-
stand first, at a deeper level, the dynamic interaction between financial and real
factors in the process of economic development in a Schumpeterian or Gerschenkronian
tradition [Kregel and Burlamaqui, 2000].
Schumpeter [1911] views finance as the motor force that allows firms to appro-
priate the resources necessary to introduce new technological innovations, since he
regards technological innovations based on the accretion of knowledge as the engine
for economic development, long before the birth of the endogenous growth model. In
his analysis, finance is the handmaiden of the creative destruction that allows indus-
try to produce technological advances and economic development. Yet, technological
innovation has to be financed by the issue of financial liabilities that can be honored
only if the innovations are successful. In this very sense, financial transactions in-
volve inherently high uncertainty and risks, creating systemic instability. The direct
link between finance and production involves, by nature, a dynamic but destructive
financial instability. This type of instability would inevitably be manifested in con-
tinuous fluctuations in economic activities accompanied by unemployment, bank-
ruptcies and structural transformation.
Schumpeter’s approach to understanding the growth dynamic of the economic
system and its dependence on the financial system shares a commonality with Marx’s
analysis of capitalist economies. They both view capitalism as an historical process
characterized by constant changes rather than by equilibrium conditions. At the same
time, Schumpeter’s perspective on uncertainty and risk is a precursor to Keynesian
macroeconomics. Gerschenkron [1962], and to a certain extent, Gurley and Shaw
[1967] carried through the Schumpeterian approach to understanding the role of
finance in economic development.
Keynes’ understanding of uncertainty and risk originates from an explicit recog-
nition that financial transactions are underpinned by intertemporal contractual com-
mitments made on agents’ expectations that are subject to extremely volatile, con-
tinuous revisions over time as unforeseen changes take place. This subjectivity and
volatility of expectations is a key to Keynes’ concept of uncertainty and risk, since it is
this attribute of real world transactions that makes financial asset prices more vola-
tile. Thus, the analysis concerns directly with systemic risk, not with idiosyncratic
risk stemming mainly from the problems associated with moral hazards and agency
costs in a world characterized by asymmetric and imperfect information.
Drawing on this Keynesian concept of risk and uncertainty as an analytical base,
Minsky [1978; 1986] advances the financial fragility thesis, which complements the
Schumpeterian perspective for advancing our understanding of financial crisis dy-
namics. Operating in the world of highly volatile macroeconomic conditions subject to
agents’ constantly revising expectations, financial fragility is an attribute of the fi-
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capitalist economy. According to his thesis, the degree of the robustness-fragility of a
financial system depends on: (a) the mix of hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance in
the economy; (b) the various mixes of yield, carrying cost and liquidity in asset port-
folios; (c) the extent to which ongoing investment is debt financed [Minsky, 1978].
These conditions, often driven by financial innovation, constantly shift around and
evolve over time.
While procyclical bank lending and asset price movements are rather a norm,
Minsky argues, once the fragility becomes a pronounced feature of financial struc-
ture, the incoherent behavioral characteristic of a financial crisis can develop with
some endogenous displacements. This could, by engendering a liquidity crisis, easily
transform financial institutions and markets from a fragile to an unstable condition,
which can in no time turn into an insolvency problem. Thus, financial fragility with
highly volatile asset prices tends to produce periodic crunches, squeezes and debacles
and at times triggers a debt deflation process.8 Financial crisis ensues as credit risks
increase with a general decline in asset quality and a flight for liquidity intensifies,
followed by a severe destruction of borrower net worth.
Critically, in both the Schumpeterian and Minskian models the source of finan-
cial fragility is endogenous to the capitalist accumulation process in a Keynesian and
Marxian tradition. Arestis and Glickman appropriately stress this distinctive as-
pect. They note that Minsky’s central thesis is the revelation that “forces capable of
producing financial fragility are built into the system itself” and that “financial fra-
gility is not due to accidents or policy errors” [2002, 238]. They contrast his thesis
with the mainstream analysis that locates the causes of crises either in government
failure or shocks, which are exogenous to the functioning of markets.
Drawing on Minsky’s fragility thesis, Kindleberger [2000] develops the panic model
of financial crisis, where asset prices are inherently volatile. They go through psycho-
logical boom-bust cycles: on the one hand, the irrationally optimistic psychology of
the boom renders loans, securities and real estates severely overvalued, and debt is
often contracted to leverage the acquisition of speculative assets for subsequent re-
sale. Thus, the phase of overinvestment/overborrowing observed in the crisis-hit econo-
mies are fuelled and sustained by excessive asset inflation in the booming years. On
the other hand, when fundamental valuation returns to asset pricing, investors over-
react in the opposite direction to real or imagined adverse shocks to the repayment
prospects of the borrowers. Panic ensues and asset prices experience ruinous declines.
Thus, the market crashes with collapse of speculative bubbles. Reflecting these highly
volatile movements of asset prices, capital markets and financial systems, both do-
mestic and international, are inherently unstable, as surges of euphoria and despair
alternate in shaping market conditions.9 Thus, Kindleberger concludes that markets
can be irrational, even when each participant in the market is acting rationally.
Relating the financial crisis to the cyclical nature of market-based economies in
general, this kind of model locates one of the primary explanations for crisis in a
Keynesian-type herdism linked to “irrational” investors’ behavior a la Kindleberger.
In international capital transactions in particular, as portfolio managers are pun-
ished for continued exposure in regions with failing prospects, investors tend to use
the behavior of others as a proxy for accurate information, all heading for the exit by297 FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
simply following the herd. This kind of herd behavior creates a condition of over-
shooting, amplifying the effect of initial events and turning collection into collapse.10
These alternative perspectives, hence, doubt the risk-assessment capacity of mar-
ket participants, even if relevant information is made available. In this context, Palma
suggests that under underregulated, overliquid international financial markets, “both
lenders and borrowers seem unable to assess and price their risks properly, and end-
up accumulating more risk than is privately efficient (let alone socially efficient)”
[1998]. Indeed, according to Chang et al., “the key problem (in East Asia) was the
evaluation of the information available: as in most of financial mania, market opera-
tors were simply unwilling to focus on the downside risks as the upside was more
attractive” [1998].
Synthesis
In our view, compared to these alternative approaches to understanding the dy-
namics of financial crises, mainstream understanding of the sources of financial fra-
gility is essentially static and trivial. For modelling periodic crises, the latter has to
resort to the static concept of market failures that arise exclusively due to asymmet-
ric and costly information or imperfect institutional environments such as adverse
selection and bankruptcy constraints.11
Furthermore, the frequent susceptibility of emerging market economies to global
financial and currency crises should be examined from both historical and institu-
tional perspectives. Eichengreen and Hausmann advance the original sin hypoth-
esis, which suggests that their incomplete domestic financial markets are at the root
of financial fragility. The hypothesis refers to “a situation in which the domestic cur-
rency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long term even domestically. In
the presence of this incompleteness, financial fragility is unavoidable because all
domestic investments will have either a currency mismatch…or maturity mismatch…”
[1999, 3]. Critically, as they note, these mismatches exist not because banks and
firms lack either the prudence to hedge their currency exposures or the foresight to
maturity mismatch, but because they are unable to do so due to their emerging mar-
kets status.
The thesis provides an interesting perspective for explaining the disadvantage
position of emerging market economies in global finance. Indeed, the financial fragil-
ity and instability of emerging market economies is closely related to their asymmet-
ric position relative to advanced countries in international finance. As Bordo and
Flandreau [2001] note, the degree of financial maturity—the ability to issue interna-
tional securities denominated in own domestic currency—is a key factor in distin-
guishing core from periphery countries for exchange rate regime choices over the
past century. The prevalence of their “Fear of Floating” [Calvo and Reinhart, 2000]
or “The Case of Hard Pegs” [Calvo, 2000] is also closely related to: (a) liability
dollarization, that is, the condition in which financial contracts are expressed in for-
eign currency; (b) fear of inflation due to the high pass-through coefficients (mea-
surements of the speed of transmission of devaluation to inflation); and (c) their na-
scent capital markets.298 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
While pointing to the precarious position of emerging economies, the debate cen-
tered around this thesis confines itself to exchange rate choices or policies towards
improving regulation and supervision of domestic financial institutions almost ex-
clusively to deal with moral hazard problems stemming from “perverse corrupt prac-
tice.”
We argue that the inability to issue debt contracts or bonds in their own currency
and with long maturity in international capital markets is fundamentally linked to
the asymmetric power relationship in the international monetary system as it has
evolved historically. It is also a reflection of the stage of economic development. If so,
the condition cannot be addressed by simply making a second-best choice for the
exchange rate regime, or by tackling a moral hazard problem only at a superficial
level. A real solution should be found in reforms of the international monetary sys-
tem so as to regulate procyclical global liquidity conditions. Urgent attention should
also be drawn to developing institutional arrangements at both global and domestic
levels, which creates conditions conducive to stable long-term finance for productive
investment.
Clearly, financial liberalization policy is based on an impoverished, static under-
standing of the finance-growth nexus. It is by now well established that the financial
repression school underestimated the problems arising from the effect of imperfect
information in credit transaction and associated incentive problems. However, all
problems in finance cannot be attributed simply to the adverse selection or moral
hazard issues. Similarly, international finance is not just a mere extension of domes-
tic finance from a perspective of policy formation. Yet, a better-designed liberaliza-
tion program, tinkered with the strengthened institutional environment, is seen as a
way forward by mainstream economists, for whom institutional measures mean just
efficient enforcement of law and contracts and effective prudential regulation and
supervision [Aizenman, 2002; Mishkin, 2001].
In our view, these policy stances are based on a shallow understanding of the
finance-growth nexus. We argue that the mainstream theory of finance at large, let
alone the repression school, misspecifies the truly dynamic simultaneous nature of
the interactions between financial and real sector activities, which is at the heart of
the alternative theories of finance. Accordingly, the two contrasting perspectives dif-
fer considerably with regard to institutional requirements for linking finance to de-
velopment.
From our alternative perspective, the failure of internal and external financial
liberalization policy cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of either perfecting the
timing, sequencing or pacing of financial reform processes, or choosing the optimal
combination of exchange rate regimes and monetary-fiscal policy configuration. De-
signing financial policies should involve all-encompassing efforts to develop the ca-
pacity of domestic and international financial systems to deal with the issue of finan-
cial fragility and instability at its core. At the same time, more appropriate and inno-
vative institutional arrangements should be in place to create mechanisms for matu-
rity transformation and liquidity regulation, so that systemic liquidity crises are col-
lectively dealt with and long-term finance is supplied for productive investment
[Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; Nissanke, 2001]. We explore some of these themes in
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ALTERNATIVE POLICY POSSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Plumbing vs. Architecture
Instead of fundamentally challenging financial liberalization, most proposals to
deal with financial instability in emerging market countries tend to focus on issues of
sequencing or the need for more regulatory authorities. Grabel [2001], in contrast,
argues it is neoliberalism that has engendered a series of interrelated risks includ-
ing: currency risks; flight risk (the mass selling of assets), the fragility risk (the vul-
nerability to external shocks stemming from maturity mismatches), contagion risk,
and finally sovereignty risk (policy options for a crisis-inflicted country delimited by
externally imposed conditionality or policies aimed strictly at dealing with the insta-
bility).
Grabel assesses a series of possible measures to counter these neoliberal-induced
risks. She evaluates the potential impact of trip wires and speed bumps, Tobin type
taxes on financial transactions, the Chilean and Columbian options of taxing, limit-
ing or setting reserve requirements on some transactions, restrictions on currency
convertibility and publicly managed closed-end mutual funds investing in emerging
markets. While she doubts the effectiveness of many “orthodox” measures, including
a uniformly levied Tobin tax, she believes the other “heterodox” policies could have
prevented or at least ameliorated the Asian crisis.
Questioning also the effectiveness of the Tobin tax, Davidson [2000] utilizes a
plumbing vs. architecture metaphor to differentiate the policy recommendations that
arise from an efficiency market perspective (embedded in the mainstream proposals)
vs. a liquidity view of financial markets. The plumbing perspective sees the current
situation as basically sound and requiring only a bit of patchwork. In contrast the
liquidity view of markets and their associated volatility requires a rethinking of the
structure of global financial markets. Using this framework, he dismisses the plumb-
ing options, placing the Tobin tax and the currency board proposals in this category.
Davidson suggests that the most viable solutions that have worked successfully
so far fall into the realm of architecture. They include: temporary administered con-
trols on capital outflows as in Malaysia, permanent restrictions on types of foreign
exchange transactions including foreign ownership of stocks as in China, the differ-
entiation of foreign exchange at different rates; differentiated taxes on different kinds
of transactions (not an across the board Tobin tax) such as is used in Chile, and the
differentiation of reserve requirements on banks reflecting the extent of foreign ex-
change exposures.
As Stiglitz has pointed out “it is no accident that the two countries that survived
the crisis—and continued with remarkable strong growth in spite of a difficult global
economic environment—were India and China both countries with strong controls
on…capital flows” [2000, 1075]. In the case of China, the restrictions on the short-
term capital account seem not to have affected its capacity to attract foreign direct
investment and perhaps might have helped it by avoiding associated instability.
While the architecture approach or Grabel’s intervention to reduce systemic risks
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beyond a few salutary measures to deal with the challenges of instability created by
neoliberalism, neither has an explicit theory of institutions or institutional transfor-
mation. Their policy recommendations are preventative or reactive rather than con-
structive in building the institutional foundations of a financial system that is devel-
opmental. To use the architectural metaphor, while they go beyond the plumbing of
the house, their solutions are more in the vein of strengthening walls or putting up
the shutters in the face of potential hurricanes. What we propose is to think about
the foundation, the purpose of the structure and the interaction of all the compo-
nents. Moreover, their focus is on emerging market countries that are already inte-
grated to a great degree in global finance. This unfortunately leaves out the majority
of developing countries that must deal not with instability but with accessibility in a
manner that will be developmentally propitious.
Architecture and Institutions
New Institutional Approach to Financial Development. To deal with these
challenges, we require a deeper understanding of institutions for financial develop-
ment. For this, we need to focus more on the interaction of the form, content and
context of the transformation of institutions, where institutions are understood not
only as constructs defined by these subcomponents but also relative to other institu-
tions. Thus, by nature, institutions are path-dependent, requiring legitimacy. For
legitimacy they must relate to internal norms [Sindzingre and Stein, 2001].
In this framework, the state, by providing an array of support such as infrastruc-
ture, licensing, regulations, and legal systems, is clearly central to both the operation
and alteration of financial markets because it is embedded in most markets. The
state also provides constructs that are internalized in markets. For example, while
legal systems provide recourse to market participants, it is frequently their existence
rather than their utilization that influences transactions. These entities become men-
tal constructs that are institutionalized within financial markets.
In dynamic terms, state regulations can set the quality and standards, which can
slowly influence the character of financial products as expectations adjust over time,
with incentives as well as threats of punitive measures. However, before designing
any path of transformation, there needs to be a full assessment of the form, opera-
tional content and interaction with other institutions. What is absolutely central to
the development of financial systems are the linkages with other institutions that
directly produce goods and services in the economy. Historically there has been an
array of models of interaction at the financial, information and monitoring levels
[Stein, 2002].
Thus, one must carefully consider the design of institutions that will ensure that
savings will flow into the most productive sectors for development. For transforma-
tion of financial systems, one must first design a parallel track of institutions that
have the potential to influence financial markets (such as corporate structures, in-
dustrial-financial ownership linkages, legal systems, international trading institu-
tions and regimes, and so on). Their rules of operation must be carefully designed
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by building up credibility through continuity, consistency, inclusiveness and interac-
tion in a manner that involves key players and the exchange of information. Finan-
cial transformation is a prerequisite for the increasing sophistication of production
and exchange that will help reverse the marginalization of many developing coun-
tries (such as those in Africa). There is little historical evidence for the spontaneous
transformation of production and exchange in general, and financial markets in par-
ticular.
Institutions and Circuits. From an institutional perspective, the challenge of
finance in the poorly formed markets of developing countries in a world of rapid glo-
bal flows is much more profound than simply the issue of bonds vs. stocks vs. bank
lending as a financial source for productive investment. Financial flows can be seen
as a series of domestic and international circuits that intersect among themselves
and with the real flows of commodity and productive resources. Institutionally, each
flow has a set of internally concatenating capacities, incentives, norms, regulations
and organizations. The mere existence of institutions says nothing about their mean-
ing, their legitimacy and the degree of internalization among the participants of each
circuit. Moreover, each flow can also be defined relative to other flows, which helps to
give them scope, content, and meaning. The totality of all of these dimensions consti-
tutes a financial system. A shift in the institutional dimensions of any one flow, such
as the regulations or relative penalties governing some form of financial device or
behavior, has direct implications for the nature of the interaction with other flows.
This is one reason why liberalization of domestic banking, along with foreign ex-
change transactions, has created some rather perverse consequences in the way that
domestic financial flows interact with international flows.
For development to occur, financial flows need to feed into real sector circuits to
enhance expansion and accumulation, and national flows need to tap into interna-
tional flows to complement the speed and capacity of the domestic flows to feed into
the real-sector circuitry. Neoliberal policies have changed the direction and purpose
of these flows. McKinnon-Shaw-inspired liberalization alters existing incentive struc-
tures through an increasing emphasis on short-term profits, introduces shifts in orga-
nizational structures through privatization or new licensing and can disrupt the op-
erational norms of banking systems. Frequently, even if new regulatory structures
are put in place, they take time to move from the formal realm to be internalized.
We can observe a common pattern of financial flows in developing countries sub-
ject to orthodox financial liberalization [Stein et al., 2002]. First, liberalization has
led to a rapid flow of resources from other sectors into finance, in a search for short-
term profits. Second, as banks moved toward speculative activities focused on the
global financial markets and capital flight and the certainty of government paper,
real lending to the private sector plummeted in many developing countries. Third,
the already short-term orientation of loan portfolios in developing countries has es-
calated. This short-termism has contributed to an erosion of bank-supported invest-
ment activities and in turn helped disrupt the developmental impact of real sector
flows. The restructuring and cleanup costs have been disproportionately large. The
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taxation, rises in interest rates, increases in international debt and a crowding out
effect caused by the flotation of government paper to finance bailouts. Asset price
deflation caused by speculative run-ups following financial liberalization has nega-
tive effects on private sector balance sheets that can inhibit investment and real
sector flows.
The main mechanism of interaction with global flows, particularly in the poorer
developing countries, has been through bilateral and multilateral debt accumula-
tion, servicing, rescheduling, and finally debt forgiveness mechanism like the World
Bank’s Debt Initiative for the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) [Nissanke and
Ferrarini, 2001]. Financial liberalization has intensified this dynamic through the
additional debt associated with sectoral adjustment loans to the financial sector and
the frequent need to take on additional debt to deal with the resuscitation of the
financial sector after liberalization. Instead of focusing on accessing global financial
flows in support of real sector circuits, governments have been preoccupied with deal-
ing with the array of conditionality associated with maintaining access to the official
aid dimension of global capital flows.
Toward the Transformation of Financial Institutions. All of this must
change. The key is the reorientation toward the transformation of new norms, incen-
tives, regulations, organizations, and capacities. Table 1 below specifies the types of
attributes associated with the institutional dimensions for financial systems that
are more developmental. The starting point is to evaluate each of these five institu-
tional areas with clear identification of the goals of any institutional transformation.
Unlike orthodox financial repression theory, however, an institutional approach avoids
universalizing policies to cover the vast differences between various developing coun-
tries and the path-dependent nature of any institutional transformation. Policies
must be contextual and arise as a result of a careful evaluation of existing financial
systems. However, at all levels it should be apparent that the state is embedded in
the operation and transformation of any financial system on multiple levels.
The key concepts used here are defined as follows: Norms are habits of thought
arising from social sanction and esteem, and are built up from an established pattern
of life and associated ways of thinking [Rutherford, 1996]. Incentives are the rewards
and penalties that arise from different forms of behavior. Unlike marginally calcu-
lating homo economicus, material rewards and penalties are recognized to be one of
several social factors influencing behavior, having more of an effect in reshaping
habits of thought, including people’s ideals and aspirations, hopes and their sense of
what is true, beautiful and good [Veblen, 1961]. Regulations refer to the legal bound-
aries that constitute the rules of operations. Organizations are entities that concat-
enate the operation of groups of people with narrowly defined common rules and
purpose. Capacities refer to levels or abilities of individuals, groups and organiza-
tions to operate effectively under rules to reach particular organizational goals.12
From Table 1, the key to harnessing finance for development is by altering the
dynamic interface between the financial and real circuits. An enumeration of finan-
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TABLE 1










• degree of trust
• extent of professional norms
• stability
• uniqueness
• degree of formalism vs. internaliza-
tion
• internal success criteria
• external success criteria
• penalties
• rewards
• degree of clarity
• enforcement mechanisms
• the homology among formal vs. infor-
mal
• the homology among the operational,
judicial and legislative levels
• financial types (merchant, develop-
ment, commercial, finance houses etc)
• ownership
• linkages (formal and informal, do-
mestic and international, financial
and real)
• public regulatory; supervisory/moni-
toring (ex ante, interim, ex post; risk
sharing; safety nets; and information
facilitation)
• regulatory and other supervisory
training
• labor force and management training
in banking and other financial insti-
tutions
• effectiveness and efficiency of public
intervention
• capacity to stabilize relative to glo-
bal and internal shocks/shifts




• extend time horizons and trust
• augment professionalism
• stability of new norms that are more de-
velopmental
• creating uniqueness to avoid competing
norms
• increasing the internalization of devel-
opmentally enhancing norms
• consistency between internal and exter-
nal criteria of success with an empha-
sis on behavior consistent with finance
for development
• the existence of a reward and penalty
system (emphasis on social sanctions
and rewards) to enhance this behavior
• ease of accessibility and understanding
of regulatory climate
• consistency between formal regulation
and the rules of operation
• consistency of the regulatory level to cre-
ate a more consistent climate of regula-
tions of banking
• creating a propitious  mix of organiza-
tions that are consistent with the needs
of production and accumulation
• ensuring the consistency between the
regulatory and supervisory structures
and financial institutions
• expanding and creating new state or-
ganizations for increasing information
flows, improving monitoring, creating
safety nets and socializing risk
• ensuring a supply of well-trained regu-
lators and bankers broadly defined
• ensuring that the rate of private sector
capacity growth and supporting public
sector structures are consonant
• increasing the access to less volatile
long-term capital flows
• increasing the depth and options avail-
able to shifting global and internal flows
• new organizations to audit and evalu-
ate accounting practices and procedures304 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
financing development. Competing norms can dissipate any effort in this direction.
To be effective, norms must be internalized with an emphasis on trust and an exten-
sion of time horizons on lending. Both are important to reducing transaction costs
and enhancing development. This effort must be coordinated with other institution
capacity-building measures, which will both help to create new norms and enhance
their overall effectiveness.
Incentives must be designed to be consistent with the new norms and to encour-
age their internalization. Incentives should be aimed at extending the time-horizons
on lending. In the early phases of development, risk will need to be socialized and
shared with the public sector in line with a clear and explicit consistency between
internal and external signals of success. Lending to areas with a much greater social
return (employment generating investment, new export capacities in new industries,
and so on) should be a focal point of any success criteria. Both moral and punitive
sanctions need to be put in place to discourage financial speculation, fraudulent be-
havior and lending to enterprises with little social and developmental value.
Legal boundaries must be clearly defined with an emphasis on consistency be-
tween operations and the regulatory climate. Moral suasion rather than formal en-
forcement of regulations needs to be emphasized with punitive options used when
operational behavior is grossly inconsistent and threatening to regulatory stability.
The focus on organizational dimensions of institutions is in creating a propitious
mix of ownership and financial types that can service the multifaceted needs of devel-
oping countries. This includes organizational structures with the potential to access
global finance. The recent tendency in many developing and transitional economies
is to fall back to a singular organizational mode largely made up of commercial banks
owned by multinational institutions, whose asset structure is skewed towards gov-
ernment paper and loans to wealthy clients and other multinationals. They often do
the very opposite of tapping global finance by exporting national savings.
Finally, capacities are perhaps the biggest challenge of the development of finan-
cial institutions, since having the rubric of laws is meaningless unless the capacities
to enforce them and interpret them exist. Similarly, organizational forms that have
the right to access global finance say nothing about their ability to exercise that
option in a manner which avoids instability and ensures that finance flows to devel-
opmentally propitious activities.
CONCLUSION
Developing countries were promised to emerge as winners from financial global-
ization as efficiency in the global allocation of resource improves. The reality has been
quite different. Capital flows have been driven mostly by push factors (that is, mar-
ket conditions prevailing in developed countries) while favorable pull conditions in
developing countries, created by liberalization and privatization programs, have served
international investors’ needs for quick returns well. There is little indication that
financial globalization will lead to enhanced development, yet we have considerable
evidence of high social and economic costs including the circumscribing of domestic
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Standard explanations for financial crises have focused on moral hazard and
adverse selection problems or coordination failures. In particular, the crisis is seen
as a domestic phenomenon associated with the macroeconomic policy trilemma. What
is recommended is following a proper liberalization sequence and moving to two cor-
ner solutions: pure floating or hard peg. It is difficult, however, to see how domestic
objectives can be met in a climate where financial regulation, both global and domes-
tic, is poor and where capital flows can be overwhelming.
In our view, neoliberal policies have changed the direction and purpose of these
flows with the kind of perverse consequences observed in many developing countries.
It is necessary to go beyond the static approach in mainstream analysis, which un-
derlies both the thinking about the relationship between capital flows and develop-
ment and the understanding and dealing with financial crises. Following works by
Schumpeter, Keynes, and Minsky, the systemic nature of instability embedded in
the nexus between finance and production is recognized. The same dynamic relation-
ship should be at the center of mechanisms for dealing with instability and improv-
ing the linkages between the financial and real sector for development purposes.
Referring to the plumbing vs. architecture metaphor used for dealing with the
problems of global finance, we argued that while the architecture approach more
clearly reflects an understanding of the systemic challenges, it lacks a theory of insti-
tutions or institutional transformation, that is, a new theory of institutions for finan-
cial development. Within such a framework, financial flows are seen as a series of
domestic and international circuits that intersect among themselves and with the
real flows of commodity and productive resources. Institutionally, each flow has a set
of internally concatenating capacities, incentives, norms, regulations, and organiza-
tions.
Complex multifaceted institutional requirements are also needed to integrate
domestic and global financial circuits. Integration must be circumscribed by high
degrees of regulation governing the categories and terms of access to global finance.
Since capacities and expertise are likely to be in limited supply, the organizational
structures will move towards the creation of valve mechanisms that carefully control
the linkage between internal and external financial circuits. The valve can also influ-
ence the direction of the flows towards the internal financial circuits that are propi-
tiously connected to real circuits.
The challenge of asymmetric power relations in international finance is profound,
requiring a new set of theoretical tools. While it is essential to reform the interna-
tional financial system in a fundamental way to deal with financial crises, develop-
ing countries will also need to find institutional mechanisms at the domestic level to
counter the asymmetries of the system. We should explicitly recognize that asym-
metric power relations are partly the result of asymmetric institutional development.
One of the focal points should be on institutional development in a manner that
deepens the linkages between finance and development. Capital flows should serve
the needs of developing countries rather the perverse inversion that we have wit-
nessed in recent years.306 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
NOTES
1. World foreign direct investment stock relative to GDP increased from 4.6 percent to 14 percent be-
tween 1980 and 1998. A similar trend has occurred in non-foreign direct investment flows with cross
border transactions in bonds and equities relative to GDP. In developing countries as a whole, the
ratio of foreign direct investment stock relative to GDP grew from 4.2 percent in 1980 to 19 percent
in 1998, while non-foreign direct investment flows increased eight-fold between 1990 and 1996 alone.
2. See Arestis and Demetriades [1997] for the synthesis of the empirical evidence.
3. Many economists of the early days such as Schumpeter [1911], Gerschenkron [1962], and Gurley and
Shaw [1967] emphasized the truly dynamic nature of the finance-growth nexus, to which we shall
return in the next section.
4. This means less freedom for providing social safety nets to people adversely affected by globalization.
5. At the annual meeting in Hong Kong in 1997, the IMF sought an amendment to its Articles of
Agreement, which would codify the Fund’s role in promoting open capital markets, as well as mem-
ber countries’ obligation to work toward the same goal [Fischer, 1997].
6. Aizenman acknowledges that while there is solid evidence that financial opening increases the chance
of financial crisis, there is more tenuous evidence that financial openness contributes positively to
long run economic growth.
7. As the Asian financial crisis unfolded it was claimed to be specific to the East Asian Model due to
crony capitalism, riddled by insider dealings, corruption and non-transparent corporate governance.
The economic policies in East Asia, which were previously regarded as a key ingredient in creating a
miracle, were suddenly written off as a curse for engendering the disaster.
8. Fisher [1933] defined debt deflation as a condition when highly leveraged borrowers receive a small
shock that can affect their net worth and trigger a series of bankruptcies. This in turn reduces
investment and demand, and leads to cumulative price deflation. Under this condition, we observe
the combination of rising excess supplies, falling prices, and a further collapse in demand.
9. Extending Minsky’s analysis to the open economy case, Arestis and Glickman [2002] examine how
openness creates a state of internationalized financial fragility, and apply this model to explain dy-
namics of the financial crisis in Southeast Asia.
10. Kregel [1998] suggests that derivative contracts may have played an integral role in creating a cumu-
lative causation that produced unexpected declines and excessive instability in both currency and
asset markets during the height of the Asian crisis.
11. For example, the dynamic model of credit cycles [Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997] is built on these concepts
to describe three types of financial shocks: a credit crunch, collateral squeeze and savings squeeze.
12.  Capacity building has become a focal point in the World Bank’s recent publications, whose formula-
tion has centered on building “good governance” structures in states through the improvement of
“accountability, transparency and the rule of law” [World Bank, 1992]. These vacuous terms reflect a
neoclassical economic vision of neutral states as the guarantors of property rights and contract en-
forcement [Stein, 2000]. In contrast, our concept developed here refers specifically to the purposeful
capacity building of institutions and systems that could lead to enhanced development finance.
REFERENCES
Aizenman J. Financial Opening: Evidence and Policy Options, NBER Working Paper No. 8900, Cam-
bridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April , 2002.
Arestis P. and Demetriades, P. Financial Development and Economic Growth: Assessing the Evidence.
Economic Journal, May, 1997, 783-799.
Arestis P. and Glickman, M. Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia: Dispelling Illusion the Minskyan Way.
Cambridge Journal of Economics, March 2002, 237-60.
Bordo M. and Flandreau, M. Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate Regimes and Globalisation. Paper pre-
sented at the NBER conference, Globalisation in Historical Perspective, Santa Barbara, 4-5 May
2001.
Calvo, G. The Case for Hard Pegs in the Brave New World of Global Finance. Paper presented at the
ABCDE Europe, Paris, June 2000.307 FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
____________. Capital Flow Volatility: Issues and Policies. Journal of African Economies, Supplement,
February 2001, 16-35.
Calvo, G. and Reinhart, C. Fear of Floating, NBER Working Paper No. 7993, Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.
Calvo G., Leiderman, L. and Reinhart, C. Inflows of Capital to Developing Countries in the 1990s.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 1996, 123-39.
Chang, H. J. South Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis, in Tigers in Trouble: Financial Governance,
Liberalisation and Crises in East Asia edited by K. S. Jomo. London: Zed Press, 1998, 222-231.
Chang, H. J., Palma G. and Whittaker, D. The Asian Crisis: Introduction. Cambridge Journal of
Economics, November 1998 649-52.
Corsetti, G., Posenti, P., and Roubini, N. What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis? Part
I and II.  Mimeo, 1998.
Davidson, P. Is a Plumber or a New Financial Architect Needed to End Global International Liquidity
Problems? World Development, June 2000, 1117-31.
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Levine, R. Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediaries: Stylized
Facts. The World Bank Economic Review, May 1996, 291-321.
Eatwell, J. International Financial Liberalisation: The Impact on World Development. Discussion Paper
Series 12, NY: United Nations Development Programme, 1997.
Eichengreen, B. Toward A New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda.
Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC., 1999
Eichengreen, B. and Hausmann, R. Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility. Pacific Basin Confer-
ence: Financial Crises in Emerging Markets, September 1999.
Fischer, S. Capital Account Liberalisation and the Role of the IMF. Hong Kong, China, 19 September
1997.
Fisher, I. The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions. Econometrica, October 1933, 337-57
Frankel, J. No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or At All Times. NBER Working Paper
7338, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
Gerschenkron, A. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1962.
Gertler M. and Rose A. Finance, Public Policy and Growth, in Financial Reforms: Theory and Experi-
ence, edited by G. Caprio, G., I Atiyas, and J. Hanson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994, 13-48.
Goldsmith, R. Financial Structure and Development. New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1969.
Goldstein, M. The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Policy Prescriptions and Lessons. Journal of African
Economies. Supplement, February, 72-103, 2001.
Grabel, I. Averting Crisis: Assessing Measures to Manage Financial Integration in Emerging Markets.
Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 2001 (forthcoming in Cambridge
Journal of Economics).
Greenwood, J. and Jovanovic, B. Financial Development, Growth and the Distribution of Income.
Journal of Political Economy, October 1990, 1076-1107.
Gurley, J. and Shaw, E. S. Financial Structure and Economic Development, Economic Development
and Cultural Change, April 1967, 257-68.
Kindelberger,  C. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 4th ed. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000.
King, R. and Levine, R. Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth: Theory and Evidence. Journal of
Monetary Economics, December, 1993 513-42.
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. Credit Cycles. Journal of Political Economy, April 1997, 211-48.
Kregel, J. A. Derivatives and Global Capital Flows: Applications to Asia. Cambridge Journal of Econom-
ics, November 1998, 677-92.
Kregel, J. A. and Burlamaqui L. Finance, Competition, Instability and Development: The Financial
Scaffolding of the Real Economy. Paper prepared for the meeting of the Other Canon Group, Venice,
Italy, 13-14 January 2000.
McKinnon, R. Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu-
tion, 1973.
McKinnon, R. and Pill, H. International Overborrowing: A Decomposition of Credit and Currency Risks.
World Development, July 1998, 1267-82.308 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Miller, M. and Luangaram, P. Financial Crisis in East Asia: Bank Runs, Asset Bubbles and Antidotes.
National Institute Economic Review, July 1998, 66-82.
Miller V. The Double Drain with a Cross-Border Twist: More on the Relationship Between Banking and
Currency Crises. American Economic Review, May 1998, 439-43.
Minsky, H. A Theory of Systemic Fragility, in Financial Crises: Institutions and Markets in a Fragile
Environment, edited by E. Altman and A. Sametz. New York: Wiley International. 1978, 138-52.
____________. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
Mishkin, F. Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in Emerging Market Countries.
NBER Paper 8087, Cambridge, MA, January 2001.
Nissanke, M. Financing Enterprise Development. Cambridge Journal of Economics. May 2001, 343-67.
Nissanke, M. and Aryeetey, E. Financial Integration and Development: Liberalisation and Reform in
Sub-Saharan Africa, Routledge: London and New York, 1998.
Nissanke, M. and Ferrarani, B. Debt Dynamics and Contingency Financing: Theoretical Reappraisal
of the HIPC Initiative. UNU/WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2001/139, December 2001, Helsinki.
Obstfeld, M. The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall
1998, 9-30
Obstfeld, M. and Rogoff, K. Foundations of International Macroeconomics, Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 1996.
Obstfeld, M. and Taylor, A. M. Globalisation and Capital Markets, paper presented at the NBER con-
ference, Globalisation in Historical Perspective, Santa Barbara, 4-5 May 2001.
Pagano, M. Financial Markets and Growth: An Overview, European Economic Review, April 1993, 613-22.
Palma, G. Three and a Half Cycles of Mania, Panic, and [Asymmetric] Crash: East Asia and Latin America
Compared. Cambridge Journal of Economics, November 1998, 789-808.
Radelet, S. and Sachs, J. The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies and Prospects, Brookings
Paper on Economic Activity No. 1, 1998.
Rousseau, P. and Sylla, R. Financial Systems, Economic Growth and Globalisation. Paper presented at
the NBER conference, Globalisation in Historical Perspective, Santa Barbara, 4-5 May 2001.
Rutherford, M. Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New Institutionalism. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996
Schumpeter, J. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1911.
Shaw, E. Financial Deepening in Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Sindzingre, A. and Stein, H. Institutions, Global Integration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
A Theoretical Enquiry, African Studies Association, 2001 Annual Meeting, Houston, Texas No-
vember, 2001.
Singh, A. Financial Liberalization, Stock Markets and Economic Development. Economic Journal, May
1997, 771-82.
Stein, H. et al., ed. Deregulation and the Banking Crisis in Nigeria: A Comparative Study. Basingstoke/
New York: Palgrave/St. Martins, 2002.
____________. The Development of the Developmental State in Africa: A Theoretical Inquiry Occasional
Papers, Center of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, December 2000.
Stiglitz, J. Capital Market Liberalisation, Economic Growth and Instability. World Development, June
2000, 1075-86.
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. 1981, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American
Economic Review, June 1981, 393-410.
Taylor, M. and Sarno, L. Capital Flows to Developing Countries: Long- and Short-Term Determinants,
The World bank Economic Review, 1997, 451-70.
Veblen, T. The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation New York: Russell and Russell, 1961.
World Bank Governance and Development. Washington, D.C: World Bank, 1992.